



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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OCPAS/CIG

CY# 285

National Intelligence Daily

*Monday
11 July 1983*

~~**Top Secret**~~

CPAS NID 83-161JX

11 July 1983

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
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


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CHAD: Habre's Situation Critical

President Habre has assumed personal command of his forces in the east, and fighting is under way at the key town of Abeche. [redacted]

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Government troops claim to have counterattacked rebel elements yesterday and to have recaptured Abeche, which they evacuated late last week, and Habre is scheduled to arrive there today with a column of reinforcements. French-supplied armored cars and munitions have arrived at Ati, some 300 kilometers southwest of Abeche. [redacted]

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France is preparing for the evacuation of its citizens and others, including Americans, from N'Djamena. An evacuation would begin in the event of a rebel advance to Ati or Moussoro in central Chad. The French Ambassador in Chad reports that a French military team is standing by in Kousseri, Cameroon, to oversee the evacuation. [redacted]

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[redacted] The first shipment of UN food aid arrived in N'Djamena on Friday across the Nigerian-Chadian border, which is scheduled to officially reopen today. [redacted]

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Comment: The Libyan-backed rebels will be in a position to advance, depending on the availability of supplies and weather conditions, toward N'Djamena along both a northern and eastern axis if Abeche falls. Unless Habre's presence and the arms and equipment being provided by the French soon begin to improve the morale and capabilities of Habre's troops, they may continue to fall back. Without military intervention by France, N'Djamena could fall as early as Wednesday. [redacted]

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SYRIA-USSR: Improving Economic Ties

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[redacted]
[redacted] a Soviet company recently won a contract to build an electric plant south of Damascus. The US Embassy in Damascus earlier reported that the Soviets were invited at the last minute to bid for the plant despite a bid with concessional financing from Japan and funds from Arab donors. The Embassy also indicated that the Syrian Government has agreed to purchase Soviet TU-154 transport aircraft and to cooperate in the field of nuclear energy. [redacted]

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Comment: Economic ties between the two countries are likely to continue to increase as long as Syria is dependent on the USSR for military equipment and advisers. The Syrians probably are attempting to meet an implied, if not stated, Soviet expectation of increased hard currency purchases in return for Moscow's shipments of sophisticated military hardware. [redacted]

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JORDAN: Reports of Unrest

Recent accounts in the Syrian press of violent antigovernment clashes in Jordan are highly exaggerated, according to the US Embassy in Amman. The Embassy has confirmed that fighting took place between members of the Bani Hassan tribe and security forces late last month when Prime Minister Badran ordered the demolition of houses built on state-owned land and some 30 people were arrested. Animosity between Badran and the tribe had resulted earlier because of a public remark by Badran about the tribe's laziness. [REDACTED]

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Comment: King Hussein's intervention appears to have calmed the tension. The overblown Syrian press stories probably were aimed at embarrassing the Jordanian Government. [REDACTED]


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
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ZAIRE: Status of Amnesty

The government has freed about 150 political and other prisoners under President Mobutu's amnesty decree of 19 May. The most prominent are 13 former members of the national legislature who had been jailed last year after trying to launch a second political party. Some of them say they will continue to work for the establishment of an opposition party, while others have been talking with officials about joining the government. A few prominent exiles have accepted the amnesty and returned to Zaire, but most are remaining abroad.



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Comment: The amnesty seems designed primarily to improve Mobutu's reputation in the West while he tries to obtain more economic and military aid. It also reflects Mobutu's confidence in the stability of his government. In view of the intransigence of some of the former legislators, there is a strong possibility that they may be arrested again.



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Special Analysis

IRAQ-IRAN: Baghdad's Search for a Way Out

Iraq is reevaluating its diplomatic and military strategy because of Iran's continuing refusal to negotiate an end to the war. Baghdad is improving its relations with Moscow—its most important source of military support—in part to ensure Soviet backing if the West tends to give more support to Iran. At the same time, the Iraqis are trying to increase their ability to stage air attacks against Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf. They will be tempted to step up the air war if they see no other way to break the diplomatic and military impasse.

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Iraqi hopes for negotiations repeatedly have been dashed. Baghdad's recent efforts to parlay talks sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council on the oilspill into progress toward a more general cease-fire have failed.

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Iraq has tried to exploit Iran's refusal to accept mediation to offset bad publicity from a recent UN report on civilian war damage that highlights Iran's losses. Largely for propaganda purposes, Iraq is urging the UN Security Council to debate the war.

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Concern Over Western Intentions

President Saddam Hussein is showing increased nervousness over the possibility that Iran will improve its ties with the West, which he fears would give it renewed access to a wide variety of advanced weapons. Senior Iraqi officials point to the growth of Iranian economic relations with some of the non-Communist industrialized countries over the past year. The Iraqi press claimed last month that the participants in the Williamsburg Summit agreed to try to improve ties with Tehran.

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Recent Iraqi criticism of the US in particular has been some of the strongest published since the war began.

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Iraq's superiority in weapons has given it its main military advantage. Although a resumption of large sales of Western arms to Iran is unlikely, such a shift does not seem improbable to Saddam. He believes the US—and the USSR—would embrace Tehran quickly if Iran were to indicate it wanted a rapprochement.

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Range of Super Etendard Aircraft Carrying Exocet Missiles

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Dependent on the Soviets

Iraq's first concern will be to maintain its ties to the USSR. Moscow has leaned perceptibly toward Baghdad in the last year. It provides crucial military support now and can supply enough arms for the long haul. [redacted]

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Baghdad also may hope that Moscow can restrain the Syrians from supporting Tehran. [redacted]

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Withdrawal of Syrian support for Iran would clear the way for the reopening of the pipeline through Syria for Iraq's oil exports—a key consideration for the financially hard-pressed Iraqis. It also would unify the Arab position on the war in favor of negotiations and isolate Iran diplomatically in the Arab world. [redacted]

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Military Options

Iraq probably still sees a defensive military strategy as the most likely way both to wear down Iran and limit its own casualties. Nevertheless, it already has the ability to intensify the fighting, and additional military equipment is on the way. [redacted]

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To cripple Iranian oil exports, however, Baghdad would have to sustain its attacks and—if Iran's important facilities on Khark Island were the target—risk heavy losses. Other important targets in the Gulf include Bandar-e Khomeini—the only functioning Iranian port with a railhead, pumping stations serving Khark, and oil tankers en route to or from Khark. [redacted]

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Prospects

Saddam does not yet appear ready to adopt an offensive war strategy that would destroy the slim chances of a negotiated settlement. If Baghdad becomes persuaded, however, that its


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
restraint is slowly leading to defeat and that direct involvement of the major powers is needed to force an end to the war, it is likely to consider riskier military initiatives. 

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Attacks against Khark Island and oil tankers probably would provoke Iranian retaliation, perhaps even against Iraq's Persian Gulf allies. These countries almost certainly will do what they can to strengthen Iraq and discourage such moves. 

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